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One hundred years ago this Sunday, on November Ǯth, ǫǳǫǬ, Bertrand Russell
delivered the Inaugural Address to the Aristotelian Society’s thirty-fourth session –
it was Russell’s second year as President. His lecture was entitled ‘On the Notion of
Cause’, and as the Proceedings here note, a discussion followed in which a number
of members took part.
Outside the Aristotelian Society, the discussion continues to this day: Russell’s
paper remains both inìuential and controversial. And it is widely known as the
source of one of the most famous lines in twentieth century philosophy: “e law
of causation”, Russell declares, “Like much that passes muster among philosophers,
is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like themonarchy, only because it is erroneously
supposed to do no harm.”
As it happens, this is the one piece of Russell’s entire philosophical output with
which my own work connects directly – certainly the only one where I make any
claim to advancing the matters under discussion. So I want to take advantage of
this happy coincidence to use my own Inaugural Lecture, to the chair that now
bears Russell’s name, to celebrate the centenary of this famous paper; and to talk
about what its conclusions look like, with the beneët of a century’s hindsight.
It is a story with a lot of Cambridge connections. Indeed, I’m not the ërst oc-
cupant of this chair to mention Russell’s paper in an inaugural lecture. Anscombe
does so in her piece ‘Causality and Determination’, from ǫǳǱǫ:
Russell wrote of the notion of cause, or at any rate of the ‘law of cau-
sation’ (and he seemed to feel the same way about ‘cause’ itself ), that,
like the British monarchy, it had been allowed to survive because it
had been erroneously thought to do no harm. In a destructive essay
of great brilliance he cast doubt on the notion of necessity involved,
unless it is explained in terms of universality, and he argued that upon
examination the concepts of determination and of invariable succes-
sion of like objects upon like turn out to be empty: they do not dif-
ferentiate between any conceivable course of things and any other.
is brings Anscombe to her own concern, namely, indeterministic conceptions
of causality, and it gives her a reason to take Russell to task: “us Russell too
ǫ
assumes that necessity or universality is what is in question, and it never occurs to
him that there may be any other conception of causality.”
My concerns are diﬀerent fromAnscombe’s, but I will follow her in one respect,
interpreting Russell’s target broadly rather than narrowly. Anscombe takes it to
include “cause”, as well as ’‘the law of causation”. I’m going to take it to include a
broad class of counterfactual judgements – judgements of the form “If A had not
happened, the B would not have happened.” I don’t suggest that Russell himself
took his thesis to extend this far; but the history of the subject since Russell’s time
has shown that such counterfactuals are closely connected not only to causation in
general, but to some of the speciëc issues about causation at the core of Russell’s
paper.
One of Russell’s key arguments concerns the time-asymmetry of causation – the
fact that eﬀects are supposed to occur later than their causes (or at least not earlier
than their causes). Russell says that there is nothing to ground such a diﬀerence
between past and future in fundamental physics. More recent writers have noted
that there is a similar time-asymmetry in counterfactual reasoning. If the lights
had failed at the beginning of this lecture, the proceedings since that moment
might well have been diﬀerent – I would not have progressed this far, for example
– but events before the failure of the lights would have just the same; or at least,
so our intuitions tell us. David Lewis calls this the “asymmetry of counterfactual
dependence,” and proposes to use it to explain the asymmetry of causation, that
Russell had taken to be missing in fundamental physics.
A good question at this point is where the time-asymmetry of counterfactual
dependence comes from, if Russell is right, and there isn’t anything suitable in
fundamental physics? I’ll come back to this.¹ For the moment, I’ve mentioned it
to make the point that we can’t sensibly discuss the issues raised by Russell’s paper
without broadening the scope in this way, to include counterfactuals.
But broadening the scope raises the stakes. Russell seems to be suggesting
that abandoning talk of causality would be practical, as well as desirable, much as
abandoning the monarchy might be: some planning, a few days of mild confusion,
and it would all be done. Indeed, he thought that modern physicists, vanguards
of the revolution, had already made the change:
All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of the
fundamental axioms or postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in
advanced sciences such as gravitational astronomy, the word ‘cause’
never occurs.
Russell then singles out for criticism his former teacher, James Ward, who was
actually the very ërst holder of this chair – its inaugural inauguree, so to speak.
Russell says that Ward makes the fact that the advanced sciences don’t mention
causation “a ground for complaint against physics: the business of science, he ap-
parently thinks, should be the discovery of causes, yet physics never even seeks
¹It’s a very good question, and not entirely resolved, perhaps, though we have been making
progress.
Ǭ
them.” Russell replies: “To me it seems that philosophy ought not to assume such
legislative functions, and that the reason why physics has ceased to look for causes
is that, in fact, there are no such things.” (After that, we get the famous line about
monarchy.)
Now, it is debatable whether Russell was right even about physics – or whether,
even if he was right about the advanced physics of his own time, what he saw was
actually a general feature of future (presumably evenmore advanced) physics. Forty
years ago, Patrick Suppes argued that Russell’s claim was not true of the physics of
the ǫǳǰǪs.
Contrary to the days when Russell wrote this essay, the words ‘causal-
ity’ and ‘cause’ are commonly and widely used by physicists in their
most recent work. ere is scarcely an issue of Physical Review that
does not contain at least one article using either ‘cause’ or ‘causality’
in its title. (Suppes ǫǳǱǪ, ǯ–ǰ)
But even if Russell is right about physics, the idea that we could dispense with
talk of causality much as we might dispense with the monarchy still seems wildly
unrealistic.
e point is evenmore obvious when we notice the way in which counterfactu-
als are liable to be swept up in the same net. For my text at this point I take some
wise words I once heard attributed to the distinguished American philosopher,
Jerry Fodor. “Why is real estate in Manhattan so damned expensive?”, Fodor asks
– “You’re paying for all those counterfactuals!” As usual from Fodor, it’s a pithy
little piece of philosophy, served with a generous amuse bouche. And he’s right, to
a considerable extent, obviously.
But imagine the consequences if Fodor’s news and Russell’s news leak out at
the same time. e value of your apartment depends on its counterfactuals, but
Bertrand Russell says there ain’t no counterfactuals! So the whole Manhattan mar-
ket is a gigantic Ponzi scheme, built not on sand, not even on paper, but literally
on nothing! It’s unthinkable – and literally so, perhaps, if counterfactual thought
is to be imagined groundless, and yet we need a counterfactual to ask the question,
as in my title.
At this point we might defend Russell by suggesting that his real target is much
more modest. His view about the the word “cause”, as he puts it, is that it “is
so inextricably bound up with misleading associations as to make its complete
extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary desirable”, and that there are no causes
at a fundamental level in physics. But this is compatible, perhaps, with recognising
a non-fundamental role for causal vocabulary (and counterfactuals too), in non-
fundamental parts of physics and in everyday life. Provided such a role could be
found, then we might save the real estate market, indeed the ënance system itself
– for what is money except a convenient form of exchangeable counterfactuals? –
without treating talk of causation and counterfactuals as tracking some deep, God-
given feature of the furniture of reality. (After all, remember the ërst three laws of
ǭ
real estate – “Location, location, location”. ey surely survive the discovery that
there is no such thing as absolute space!)
So we can defend Russell by taking him, like Hume before him perhaps, to be
proposing only an armchair revolution. He wants to banish “causation” from the
kind of serious conversation that goes on around the Great Court at Trinity (and
similarly venues elsewhere, if such there be), without banishing it from the streets.²
But even this modest armchair revolution seems to be undone by a famous pa-
per by Nancy Cartwright from ǫǳǱǳ, her “Causal Laws and Eﬀective Strategies.”
Cartwright begins with Russell’s distinction between symmetric laws of association
– the kind of Humean regularities Russell thinks that modern physics actually of-
fers us – and the asymmetric causal laws Russell thinks we need to dispense with
(at least in the armchair). She notes that Russell argues for two conclusions: in
her words, (i) that “laws of association are all the laws there are”, and (ii) “that
causal principles cannot be derived from the causally symmetric laws of associa-
tion”. She goes on to argue “in support of Russell’s second claim, but against the
ërst.” (ǫǳǱǳ: Ǯǫǳ) at is, she agrees that “[c]ausal laws cannot be reduced to laws
of association”, but maintains that “they cannot be done away with.” (ǫǳǱǳ: Ǯǫǳ)
Figure ǫ: Cartwright’s example – the letter from TIAA
Cartwright’s argument is that causal laws are needed to ground an an important
distinction between eﬀective and ineﬀective strategies. She illustrates this distinc-
tion with some examples, one of them a letter she tells us she received from an
insurance company (Figure ǫ). Cartwright argues that the objective fact reported
in the ërst line of this letter – viz., that buying life insurance from this company
would not be an eﬀective strategy for living longer – depends on causal rather
than merely probabilistic facts about the world. But, she argues, the “objectivity of
strategies requires the objectivity of causal laws”. In other words,
causal laws cannot be done away with, for they are needed to ground
the distinction between eﬀective strategies and ineﬀective ones. …
[T]he diﬀerence between the two depends on the causal laws of our
universe, and on nothing weaker. (ǫǳǱǳ: ǮǬǪ)
Commenting on Cartwright’s argument in a recent survey paper, Hartry Field
concludes:
²(Where contemporary physics falls under this regime would be a matter for debate. We would
need to ëgure out what physicists mean when they talk of causation, and that might be a lengthy
investigation.)
Ǯ
is makes a compelling case against Russell’s view that we should do
without causal notions. But Cartwright herself draws a much stronger
conclusion, a kind of causal hyper-realism…. She holds that the causal
fact that a force on an objectmakes the object go faster is not reducible
to Newton’s [second] law, nor to other noncausal facts either, such
as the equations of energy ìow …. (Such equations are just further
parts of fundamental physics, which she regards as “laws of associa-
tion” rather than as causal.) Rather, the claim that a force on an object
makes the object go faster states a further truth about the world that
physics leaves out. Evidently there is some sort of causal ìuid that is
not taken account of in the equations of physics; just how it is that
we are supposed to have access to its properties I am not sure. (Field
ǬǪǪǭ)
Field ënds this hyper-realism unpalatable, but recognises the importance of
Cartwright’s challenge:
[D]espite the implausibility of the hyper-realist picture, we have a
problem to solve: the problem of reconcilingCartwright’s points about
the need of causation in a theory of eﬀective strategy with Russell’s
points about the limited role of causation in physics. is is probably
the central problem in the metaphysics of causation. (Field ǬǪǪǭ)
I agree with Field, except that I think it would be better to say that it is one of
two central problems, the other being Russell’s issue of the time-asymmetry of
causation. Accounting for that is a further diﬃculty for the hyper-realist view, but
it is a problem for all views, including views which want to regard causation as
something relatively non-fundamental.³
Ǭ R  -
Russell’s own treatment of the problem of the apparent time-asymmetry of cau-
sation is important more because he sees that there is a problem than because he
provides any satisfactory solution, or dissolution. Let’s have a look at the central
passage. Russell puts his cards on the table straightaway:
We all regard the past as determined simply by the fact that it has
happened; but for the accident that memory works backward and not
forward, we should regard the future as equally determined by the fact
that it will happen.
In other words, so Russell is claiming, there’s no real distinction between past and
future, but an accident about us – the fact that memory works backwards not
³is problem has also been much discussed in recent literature, especially by way of criticism of
David Lewis’s attempt, mentioned above, to explain a corresponding asymmetry of counterfactual
dependence, to which that of causation might then be reduced.
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forwards – tricks us into thinking that there is. He then counters his own claim
with a plausible objection:
“But,” we are told, “you cannot alter the past, while you can to some
extent alter the future.”
In reply to this Russell makes two points. e ërst that while it is true that “you
cannot make the past other than it was”, this is just a matter of logic, and the
same is true with respect to the future. e second – acknowledging, I think, that
the ërst has not got to the heart of the matter – introduces what turns out be an
important link between what we think we can inìuence and what we can know:
[I]f you happen to know the future—e.g., in the case of a forthcoming
eclipse—it is just as useless to wish it diﬀerent as to wish the past
diﬀerent.
Russell’s self-scripted interlocutor now does a good job of getting things back on
track:
“But,” it will be rejoined, “our wishes can cause the future, sometimes,
to be diﬀerent from what it would be if they did not exist, and they
can have no such eﬀect upon the past.”
(Even though we often don’t know the past, if would have been helpful to add!)
At this point, I think, Russell loses his grip on the force of his opponent’s
argument. What he says is just this:
is, again, is a mere tautology. An eﬀect being deíned as something
subsequent to its cause, obviously we can have no eﬀect upon the past.
But we can just give Russell the terms “cause” and “eﬀect”, deëned in this way, and
press the original objection as the question as to why it never makes sense to act
for (or “wish for”) ends which – while not eﬀects of our actions (being ruled out
as such by this deënition, because they lie in the past) – are nevertheless desirable,
from our point of view. Why is it useless to do something now to ensure that my
ticket was the winning ticket in a lottery drawn yesterday, for example (if I don’t
yet know that it is not)? Call this the problem of the time-asymmetry of deliberation.
Russell doesn’t get this problem in focus, I think. You can’t avoid the question by
saying that an end for which we act is by deínition an eﬀect of our action, because
then you’d have two deënitions of “eﬀect” in play, and you’d need to explain why
they line up – and that’s just the original problem.
ere then follows an interesting little passage I won’t go into in detail, in which
Russell is in eﬀect denying what we now call the asymmetry of counterfactual
dependence:
But that does not mean that the past would not have been diﬀerent if
our present wishes had been diﬀerent. Obviously, our present wishes
ǰ
are conditioned by the past, and therefore could not have been diﬀer-
ent unless the past had been diﬀerent; therefore, if our present wishes
were diﬀerent, the past would be diﬀerent. Of course, the past cannot
be diﬀerent from what it was, but no more can our present wishes be
diﬀerent from what they are; this again is merely the law of contradic-
tion.
And Russell then sums up:
e facts seem to be merely (ǫ) that wishing generally depends upon
ignorance, and is therefore commoner in regard to the future than in
regard to the past, (Ǭ) that where a wish concerns the future, it and
its realization very often form a “practically independent system,” i.e.,
many wishes regarding the future are realized. But there seems no
doubt that the main diﬀerence in our feelings arises from the fact that
the past but not the future can be known by memory.
I want to emphasise three points:
ǫ. Russell is trying to explain the apparent time-asymmetry of causal depen-
dence as a product of a diﬀerence in us, rather than a fundamental diﬀerence
in reality. (As I’ll explain, I think he’s right about that.)
Ǭ. e diﬀerence he picks concerns memory, but it’s doubtful whether that can
do the trick – it doesn’t draw a clean enough cut between past and future,
because we remember rather little of the past, and know some of the future
by other means.
ǭ. He already has on the table the idea that the business of “realization of our
wishes”, as he quaintly puts it, is important in explaining the illusion of
asymmetry – though, hampered by the thought that it is all about memory,
he doesn’t get very far.
And that positions us for the next step in this story, which belongs to perhaps the
greatest of all these early twentieth century Cambridge giants, Frank Ramsey.
ǭ R’  
e step in question occurs in Ramsey’s very late paper, ‘General Propositions
and Causality’, a rough thirty-page manuscript dated September ǫǳǬǳ (just four
months before Ramsey’s tragically early death, at the age of Ǭǰ). About two-thirds
of the way through, Ramsey turns to the issues of the diﬀerence between past and
future and the direction of causality. en, in a few short paragraphs – little more
than two handwritten pages – he dissects his way to core of the problem, and shows
us what he takes to lie at its heart. In my view, this is one of the most insightful
passages not merely in twentieth century philosophy, but in all of philosophy. In-
deed, given the centrality of the issues at stake here – causality, the direction of
Ǳ
time, and the location, in these respects, of the cut between what properly belongs
in the world, and what it some sense ‘stems from us’ – I think it has some claim
to be a signiëcant landmark in human thought as a whole.
But as usual, Ramsey is here “too brisk for most philosophers,” as HughMellor
said of a diﬀerent piece of Ramsey in his own inaugural lecture in ǫǳǲǲ. And
unusually, I think, he doesn’t quite get everything right – this was just the back of
the envelope version, as you can see. But he does give us an answer to both the
puzzles we have on the table. (I’ll give you the core of the relevant passage, and
then highlight the key points I think it contains.)
It is, it seems, a fundamental fact that the future is due to the present
… but the past is not. What does this mean? It is not clear and, if we
try to make it clear, it turns into nonsense or a deﬁnition …
[W]e think there is some diﬀerence between before and after at which
we are getting; but what can it be? ere are diﬀerences [What does
Ramsey have in mind?] between the laws deriving eﬀect from cause
and those deriving cause from eﬀect; but can they really be what we
mean? No; for they are found a posteriori, but what we mean is a
priori.
What then do we believe about the future that we do not believe about
the past; the past, we think, is settled; if this means more than that it
is past, it might mean that it is settled for us,… that any present event
is irrelevant to the probability for us of any past event. But that is
plainly untrue. What is true is this, that any possible present action
volition of ours is (for us) irrelevant to any past event. To another (or
to ourselves in the future) it can serve as a sign of the past, but to us
now what we do aﬀects only the probability of the future.
is seems to me the root of the matter; that I cannot aﬀect the past,
is a way of saying something quite clearly true about my degrees of
ǲ
belief. Again from the situation when we are deliberating seems to
me to arise the general diﬀerence of cause and eﬀect. We are then en-
gaged not on disinterested knowledge or classiﬁcation (to which this
diﬀerence is utterly foreign), but on tracing the diﬀerent consequences
of our possible actions, which we naturally do in sequence forward
in time, proceeding from cause to eﬀect not from eﬀect to cause. We
can produce A or A0 which produces B or B0 which etc. …; the prob-
abilities of A, B are mutually dependent, but we come to A ﬁrst from
our present volition. … In a sense my present action is an ultimate
and the only ultimate contingency.
Let me outline some of the ideas we ënd in this extraordinary passage.
. Agency is the key to understanding causation
Ramsey thinks that causation – especially the asymmetry of causation, the diﬀer-
ence between cause and eﬀect – needs to be understood by thinking about “the
situation when we are deliberating.” is idea turns up in later writers, including
at least three with Cambridge connections. e ërst was Douglas Gasking, a stu-
dent here in the ǫǳǭǪs, and later a lecturer at the University of Melbourne, who
defends the idea in a wonderful paper in Mind in ǫǳǯǯ; the second was G H von
Wright, brieìy Wittgenstein’s successor in this chair, who defended such a view
in the ǫǳǱǪs. (In Oxford, Collingwood had proposed it in the ǫǳǮǪs.) But so far
as I know, none of these writers recognised that Ramsey was on to the idea, nor
gets anywhere close to the insights that connect Ramsey’s version of the view to
the issues raised by Russell’s paper.
Later, in the early ǫǳǳǪs, I also defended a version of this agency view, both in
joint work with my Australian colleague Peter Menzies and elsewhere. (is time
Ramsey does get a mention, as do issues such as the time-asymmetry of causation,
and Cartwright’s challenge to Russell.) More recently still, the idea that causation
needs to be understood in terms of “manipulation”, as people now say, has been
very prominent over the past decade or so, thanks to the work of the philosopher
JimWoodward and the computer scientist Judea Pearl, amongst others. But Ram-
sey was the ërst, so far as I know.
. Probability looks diﬀerent from an agent’s point of view
Ramsey’s key insight is that agents are epistemically “special” – probability judge-
ments are properly diﬀerent from an agent’s ërst-person point of view, than from
a third-person point of view (even that of the same agent at other times). Ramsey
puts this initially as the claim that our own present volitions are, for us, probabilis-
tically independent of “any past event”. He doesn’t actually tell us why this is so,
though he does give us a hint at the end: “my present action is an ultimate and the
only ultimate contingency”.
ǳ
What he has in mind is a generalisation of a familiar point about how knowl-
edge and free choice conìict. It doesn’t make sense to take yourself to be choosing
between options one of which you know to obtain. (Remember Russell’s exam-
ple of the eclipse, known in advance.) e point emerges in the oddity of saying
something like, “I know I’ll vote for Obama, but I’m still making up my mind.”
You take away with one hand the authority you bestow with the other, much as in
Moore’s paradox, when you say “P, but I don’t believe that P.”
Ramsey generalises this point from knowledge to credence, so that it becomes
the claim that an agent cannot take herself to have evidence about what she is going
to do, as she deliberates. (“Deliberation screens prediction”, as later writers have put
it.) From the agent’s point of view, her contemplated action must be regarded as
probabilistically independent of anything she does she know at present – even if
other people (or she herself at other times) could legitimately take something of that
kind as evidence about her choice, or vice versa.
In my view, this is the key to solving Field’s puzzle. e diﬀerences Cartwright
rightly points to between the probabilities we get from laws of association, on the
one hand, and the probabilities associated with what we take to be causal depen-
dencies, on the other, are precisely the diﬀerences induced by the specialness of
agency. Cartwright is right in thinking that we can’t explain eﬀective strategy in
terms of the former; but wrong to think that we need causal laws to give us the
latter. On the contrary, as I think Ramsey ërst saw, it’s the other way round: the
specialness of the agent’s perspective grounds our talk of causation.
. e time-asymmetry of causation
is leaves the problem of the time-asymmetry of causation, and here I think Ram-
sey is at least looking in the right direction, saying it depends “on tracing the diﬀer-
ent consequences of our possible actions, which we naturally do in sequence forward
in time.” e ërst comment we need to make here is that “consequences” must
mean something like “probabilistic dependencies”, if Ramsey is not to be accused
of slipping in talk of causation at this point. Second, since Ramsey has already
appealed to the idea that there are no such dependencies between our present ac-
tions and events in the past, the qualiëcation “naturally” is in a sense unneeded:
if Ramsey is right, there are no dependencies except “forward in time.” (Imagine
turtles hatched on an East-facing beach. Is it any surprise that their journey takes
them asymmetrically to the East? No, for there are no routes to the West, from
their point of view.)
Still, the term “naturally” is useful in another sense. It reminds us that we are
appealing to a feature of our natures – a universal feature for us, albeit perhaps a
contingent one. As structures in spacetime, we human agents all share a common
temporal orientation. Imagine depicting our deliberative lives on a spacetime map,
with a little arrow connecting each instance of deliberation to its associated action
(where there is one). For us, all those little arrows point in the same direction –
from past to future, as we would normally put it.
ǫǪ
Or, to go back to the turtles, think of yourself as a beach, and of your own
plans and deliberations as the turtles that hatch on that beach. What’s true is not
only that all plans hatch in the same direction on each beach individually, but also
that all the beaches we know of face in the same direction. It is an interesting
question whether there could be creatures elsewhere whose beaches face in the
other direction – whose plans hatch from future to past, by our lights. e answer
is probably yes, in my view, so long as they are far enough away in spacetime to
live in a region with low entropy in (what we call) the future, rather than (what
we call) the past, but that’s a long story. e point is that universality amongst us,
individually and collectively, is quite enough to explain our sense that the direction
of causation is an a priorimatter – it is a priori, if you are built as we are, and if talk
of causation depends on agency, in the sense that Ramsey suggests. (If Ramsey is
right, then, the relevant contingency is not, as Russell thought, that memory only
works backwards, but rather that deliberation only works forwards.)
. e past is oﬀ-limits … or is it?
In making agency central in this way, in spotting the special character of the agent’s
epistemic perspective, and in seeing the work it can do in giving us an account of
the diﬀerence between cause and eﬀect, I think Ramsey gets much further than
Russell. But there’s one respect in which Russell still outdoes him, in my view.
Ramsey actually gives us no reason at all why the epistemic bifurcation he identiëes
– the split between things for which our present volition can count as evidence, and
things for which it can’t – should line up neatly with the future/past distinction.
He asserts conëdently that it does, or at least that the entire past lies on the latter
side of the line: “What is true is this, that any possible present volition of ours
is (for us) irrelevant to any past event.” But he oﬀers no argument at this point,
or explanation of the fact in question, if it is a fact. Russell at least has a punt at
it, associating it with “the fact that the past but not the future can be known by
memory.”
is part of the puzzle wasn’t properly sorted out until the ǫǳǰǪs, when the
Oxford philosopher Michael Dummett pointed out that one could quite coher-
ently take oneself to aﬀect the past – that is, in Ramsey’s terms, take one’s present
volitions to be relevant to some past event – so long as one didn’t take oneself to
be able to know about the relevant part of the past, before one acted.⁴
Dummett points out that the knowledge condition might coherently be held
to fail: there might be past events of which we thought that we couldn’t have
knowledge, at least at present, even in principle. If so, it isn’t incoherent to think
that we might aﬀect them, by bring about some state of aﬀairs in the future, with
which they in turn are reliably correlated. Our initial action has to lie in the future,
of course – that’s the point above, about the turtles needing to swim East to get
⁴Interestingly, Dummett’s discussion can be taken to show how the usual objections to back-
ward causation rely on the same tension between knowledge and free action that lies at the heart of
Ramsey’s proposal.
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away from the beach. But in Dummett’s picture our inìuence can then zig-zag
back into the past, much as our turtles might then swim West, if gaps or inlets in
the beach permitted it. In this respect then, I think that Ramsey misses something
important. He’s right about the character of the diﬀerence between cause and
eﬀect, but wrong about how it needs to line up with the distinction between past
and future. Dummett shows how it might be false that, as Ramsey puts it, “any
possible present volition of ours is (for us) irrelevant to any past event.”
Dummett’s own interest was in the eﬃcacy of retrospective prayer, but I think
his ideas have a more down-to-earth application, in the case of quantummechanics
– the reason we haven’t noticed the gaps in the beach being that they so small, as
it were. is is admittedly not a popular view, and I don’t have time to explain it
here, but I would like to put on record the view that the reason it has remained
unpopular is in part because people who think about such things are unaware of
the deep insight of Ramsey’s view of causation, that it is the agent who is in the
driver’s seat, in determining the direction of causation in nature (in so far as there is
such a thing), not the other way round. Or, if they are aware of it, they haven’t also
noticed what Ramsey got wrong and Dummett got right, that the resulting causal
arrow need not point exclusively to the future. It may also be that Dummett’s
loophole is particularly hard to see, because our ordinary ways of causal thinking
are so deeply ingrained – because they are hardwired, in eﬀect. ere has been
much fascinating work in recent years by psychologists such as Alison Gopnik,
revealing the extent to which our causal thinking is innate (developing in various
stages during infancy). If one were designing a folk physics for creatures like us,
there’s no doubt at all that simply treating the past as ëxed – saying “Don’t even
think about aﬀecting the past!” – would be a useful place to start. It’s quick, and
even if I’m right it’s only dirty in places that are never going to matter, in ordinary
life. (Similarly, turtles might be hardwired to swim East, even in an environment
in which there were occasional opportunities to swim West.)
. Summary: what we get from Ramsey
Setting aside this last issue, we can see that Ramsey oﬀers us the beginnings of an
answer to the two big puzzles about causation we identiëed earlier:
ǫ. Field’s challenge. Ramsey shows us how to reconcile Cartwright with Rus-
sell, without hyper-realism. Ramsey’s Special Agent gives us the distinction
Cartwright shows us that we need, between probabilistic dependencies en-
coded in the objective laws of association, and those that survive from the
point of view of the deliberating agent.
Ǭ. e direction of causation. e diﬀerence between cause and eﬀect is ac-
counted for in terms of what we can manipulate to do what, and the pre-
vailing temporal orientation of this ‘causal arrow’ is explained in terms of a
contingent asymmetry in us, the fact that we deliberate “past-to-future”.⁵
⁵Itself traceable presumably to the thermodynamic asymmetry, though I haven’t said anything
ǫǬ
And the upshot is that Russell comes oﬀ rather well – if Ramsey is right, so too is
Russell, about the claim that causation is not as fundamental as many philosophers
have thought. More on this in a moment, but ërst a word about counterfactuals.
Ǯ A   
Where do counterfactuals ët in? A couple of pages earlier in ‘General Propositions
and Causality’, Ramsey has this to say about the kind of conditional judgements
we need in practical deliberation:
When we deliberate about a possible action, we ask ourselves what
will happen if we do this or that. If we give a deënite answer of the
form ‘If I do p, q will result,’ this can properly be regarded as a ma-
terial implication or disjunction ‘Either not-p or q.’ But it diﬀers,
of course, from any ordinary disjunction in that one of its members
is not something of which we are trying to discover the truth, but
something it is within our power to make true or false. [Footnote:
“It is possible to take one’s future voluntary action as an intellectual
problem: ‘Shall I be able to keep it up?’ But only by dissociating one’s
future self.”]
Besides deënite answers ‘If p, q will result’, we often get ones ‘If p, q
might result’ or ‘qwould probably result’. Here the degree of probabil-
ity is clearly not a degree of belief in ‘Not-p or q’, but a degree of belief
in q given p, which it is evidently possible to have without a deënite
degree of belief in p, p not being an intellectual problem. And our
conduct is largely determined by these degrees of hypothetical belief.
In other words, Ramsey is claiming here that the kind of conditionals we need
in deliberation are not counterfactuals, not claims about what would be the case
had something been diﬀerent. ey are hypotheticals, claims about what is true if
something is the case, for a very special kind of “something” – propositions that
can’t be intellectual problems, as he puts it, because we take them to be “within
our power to make true or false.”
If Ramsey is right, then we don’t need counterfactuals, where many people have
thought that we do need them, as a foundation for our theory of decision. Instead
we have the prospect that we might be able to explain talk of counterfactuals in
terms of these simpler kind of hypotheticals. Something like this idea has been
proposed by the psychologist Alison Gopnik, I think. Her idea is that we can
employ these deliberative skills not merely online, when facing real choices, but
also oﬄine, when facing imaginary choices (or, perhaps a better way to put it,
when imagining that we are facing real choices). “Counterfactuals are the price
we pay for hypotheticals,” as Gopnik puts it: they are a kind of by-product of
about that here.
ǫǭ
the hypotheticals we need in decision, combined with our faculty of imagination.
Again, I don’t have time to explore this idea here. e point I want to make is
simply that if it is correct, then it will give us a satisfyingly Russellian account of
counterfactuals, just as Ramsey’s main proposal does for causation.
ǯ C 
So are there causes, if Ramsey is right? I think the answer is, “Yes, but they’re
not as much part of the furniture as we might have thought.” Causation goes on
the side of the secondary qualities, to use an analogy I explored in an early paper
with Peter Menzies. As Richard Corry and I noted in a recent collection, we can
characterise this option in terms of Russell’s own constitutional metaphor. In the
political case, we can distinguish three views of political authority. A traditional
monarchist, at one extreme, takes it to be vested in our rulers by God. If we reject
that view, we have two choices: there’s the anarchist option of rejecting the notion
of political authority altogether; or the milder republican option, which agrees with
the traditional monarchist that there is political authority, but sees it as a social
creation, vested in our rulers by us.
By analogy, the republican option exists in metaphysics, too. Causal repub-
licanism is thus the view that although the notion of causation is useful, perhaps
indispensable, in our dealings with the world, it is a category provided neither by
God nor by physics, but rather constructed by us. From this republican stand-
point, then, thinking of eliminativism about causality as the sole alternative to
full-blown realism is like thinking of anarchy as the sole alternative to the divine
right of kings.
As I noted, there’s an issue about where we put Russell: Is he an anarchist or
a republican, in this new terminology? I suggested that we might see him, with
Hume, as what now counts as an armchair anarchist, happy to retain talk of cau-
sation and counterfactuals for ordinary purposes. And that’s really the republican
option, or at least the reìective, clear-headed version of the republican option, that
wants to combine a full-blooded participation in ordinary ways of speaking with
a detached, over-the-shoulder understanding of how we come to speak that way,
and how it might have been otherwise – “contingency, irony and solidarity,” in
the words of another of my philosophical heroes.
How is this news going to be taken by the market? It won’t be a shock, pre-
sumably, to learn that market values reìect the subjective preferences we humans
have for various possible ends and outcomes.⁶ All of this depends on the fact that
we are creatures who operate under uncertainty: “All our lives we are in a sense bet-
ting,” as Ramsey puts it. What the republican view of causation does is to extend
the story to the case of creatures who are also agents – they intervene in the envi-
ronment about which they hold such beliefs and preferences. Certainly it shows
⁶(Another of Ramsey’s great contributions was to ëgure out how to systematise and measure such
things, along with our degrees of belief, in the context of their role in guiding our choices.)
ǫǮ
that causal and counterfactual talk would be unneeded for creatures who didn’t do
that – intelligent trees, for example, as Michael Dummett once put it. But that’s
no threat to the real estate market, obviously, unless the good folk of Manhattan
become a lot more passive than they have tended to be to date.
ǰ R   
So much for causation. But when it occurred to me that I had an opportunity to
celebrate the centenary of ‘On the Notion of Cause’ on this occasion, I was curious
about what Russell had had in mind in the other part of his famous line: just what,
in Russell’s view, is the harm that the monarchy is erroneously thought not to do?
I assumed that this would be an easy curiosity to satisfy – somewhere, presumably,
Russell would have expressed his views about the monarchy at greater length. But
I searched in vain.
Eventually I wrote toNicholas Griﬃn, of the Russell Archives atMcMaster. He
told me that there was really nothing to ënd, not even in Russell’s correspondence,
so far as he knew it. But he did suggest a context for Russell’s remark. In ǫǳǫǪ
Britain had concluded a considerable constitutional crisis, bought on by the Liberal
government’s determination to remove the veto power of the House of Lords. A
crucial step had been the King’s indication that he would support the government,
if necessary, by creating a suﬃcient number of new Liberal peers to ensure passage
of the Bill through the Lords. (Russell himself would have been one of those new
peers, apparently, in that counterfactual world.) Professor Griﬃn suggested that
in the light of the King’s support, some on the Liberal side of politics were inclined
to say that the monarchy wasn’t so bad after all; and that Russell may have been
taking the opportunity to indicate that he was made of sterner stuﬀ – that the old
battle lines of the Russells remained unchanged, as it were.
But that doesn’t tell us what Russell thought that the harm in question actu-
ally was, at that point in the nation’s history – when, thanks in part to Russell’s
own ancestors, it had long been a “crowned republic”, as Tennyson put it (a fact
reaﬃrmed and strengthened in the recent crisis, of course). So, as my centenary
footnote to Russell’s great paper, I want to ënish by giving you my own view. In
my view, there is a signiëcant cost to modern constitutional monarchies that is
remarkable, among other things, for the fact that although it is in plain sight, it
goes unmentioned, and apparently almost unnoticed. As you’ll see, it is indeed a
relic of a bygone age, whose signiëcance is hidden from us by the sheer familiarity
of the system of which it is a consequence – by the fact that a traditional picture
holds us in its grip, as Wittgenstein might have put it. Moreover, while I’m not
suggesting that this is what Russell actually had in mind, it is, as you’ll also see,
something that he in particular would have had reason to have in mind – it res-
onates in several ways with signiëcant aspects of his own life. And it connects in a
deep way with the themes I have been talking about so far. In all senses, then, it’s
an excellent ët.
ǫǯ
I can introduce the point by noting a diﬀerence of opinion with most of my
Australian compatriots. A majority of Australians appear to favour an Australian
republic, even though many of them voted against it when they had the chance
some years ago, because they didn’t like the model on oﬀer. But the main reason
given is that Australia should have an Australian head of state, rather than the
British monarch – and while I don’t disagree with that sentiment, I do think it
misses a much more powerful appeal to the country’s professed values.
Australia’s next head of state, under present arrangements, is a man whose af-
fection for the country dates from ǫǳǰǰ, when he was sent for a couple of terms to
a boarding school there. It was a formative experience, apparently – “If you want
to develop character, go to Australia”, as he put it recently (going on to mention
some of the character-building epithets employed by his Australian schoolmates).
I feel very much on the same wavelength as the Prince at this point, because I
encountered those same character-building opportunities, and no doubt the same
epithets, the very same year, as a teenage migrant from the UK – I arrived just three
weeks after he left.
Our lives diverged quite markedly after that point, of course. He came to
Trinity, had a memorable gig in Wales in ǫǳǰǳ, and has now served his country
and the Commonwealth with considerable distinction, for more than forty years.
I went to ANU, making the ërst of many choices that turned out to lead – happily
and rather astoundingly – to the present occasion. (Not quite a gig in Wales,
perhaps, but memorable for me, nonetheless!)
But the particular diﬀerence I want to highlight is that in common with most
of my generation, in countries such as Britain and Australia, I made choices about
what to do with my life; whereas he did not, to an unusual extent. Signiëcant as
his life’s work is, the boy on the left there did not have the opportunity to choose
it, or to volunteer for it, in any meaningful sense.
So that’s why I disagree with most of my compatriots, republicans and monar-
chists alike, about the issue of an Australian republic. ey think that the question
turns on the importance or otherwise of Australia’s having a Australian head of
state. I think that that’s a trivial matter, a mere sideshow, compared to the princi-
ple that all young people should be allowed to choose for themselves what they do
with their lives, when they grow up. e professed Australian value I mentioned a
moment ago is simply that of fairness – of a “fair go,” as Australians say. It seems
to me profoundly and manifestly unfair to select children by accident of birth for
future public oﬃce – especially so, of course, for such an important, symbolic and
public public oﬃce – and hence entirely inappropriate that Australia’s constitution
should make us party to a practice of doing so.
Apart from the fact that Australians like to make a fuss about fairness, there’s
nothing uniquely Australian about the point, of course. It applies with equal force
in all the modern democratic monarchies – almost all of which (eight in total, ne-
glecting some tiny principalities) are in Europe. e eight countries in question –
three Scandinavian countries, three Benelux countries, Spain, and Britain – actu-
ally care just as much about fairness as Australians do, of course. So it’s an issue
ǫǰ
for all of them, in just the same way.
It is easy to see why I think this point is Russellian in spirit. As is well known,
Russell felt the constraints of his own childhood very deeply, and was greatly re-
lieved to escape them when he came of age.⁷ Later, when he himself became a
father, Russell was a famous advocate of allowing children as much freedom as
possible.⁸ And ënally, of course, he was also a famous opponent of conscription.
It would be a little extreme, perhaps, to compare hereditary monarchy to con-
scription. A neutral term might be “involuntary service”, or “involuntary servi-
tude”, as prohibited by the irteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. In
that case, the US Supreme Court later ruled that the Amendment did not prohibit
service properly rendered to the state, such as military conscription, or jury duty.
But as those cases make clear, it would be unthinkable that these exclusions might
be lifetime matters (or apply to individuals chosen in infancy, presumably).
It would be unthinkable in any other advanced democracy, too, if we were
starting from scratch. If someone proposed that we should ëll public oﬃces by
selecting infants who would be brought up to ëll the roles in question, the main
objection would not be that it was undemocratic, but that it was absurdly unfair
to the individuals concerned. e fact that we do ënd this system thinkable in
practice turns mainly on its sheer familiarity – that’s just how things are done.
And perhaps, as Russell thinks in the case of causation, we are still in the grip
of a piece of bad metaphysics: we think of royalty as a natural kind, and hence
imagine that it is a natural matter that royal children should be brought up to play
these roles – that’s the kind of beings they are, as it were. e picture holds us
captive, and central to it is the fantasy that what these families enjoy is a matter of
entitlement and privilege, not constraint and obligation.
It is easy to see how we got to this point, from the distant past this picture
actually depicts: on the one hand, a great erosion of power on the side of royalty,
as – thanks in part to Russell’s ancestors, in the British case – its powers were
curtailed; on the other hand, an even greater expansion of opportunity on the side
of ordinary people, especially ordinary children, as we have come to accept that
young people should make their life choices for themselves, rather than have them
dictated by parents or accidents of birth. e combination of these two factors
means that the heirs to modern monarchies are now marooned on a little island
of underprivileged; impoverished not only compared to their own ancestors, but
also, much more importantly, compared to the standards that now exist in the
community at large.
Here the point connects back to the main themes of my lecture, and indeed of
Russell’s, broadly interpreted. For what precisely is it that these individuals lack,
compared to their contemporaries? Of what are they deprived? Essentially, it is
⁷e heirs to the monarchies of Europe don’t have that opportunity, of course. It is true that in
principle they could abdicate, but at considerable cost – like it or not, they are public ëgures, after
all – and only by passing the unasked-for obligation to a sibling or cousin.
⁸e fact that that experiment wasn’t entirely successful gives us no reason to think he would
ever have approved of the extreme restriction of opportunity involved in hereditary monarchy.
ǫǱ
counterfactuals. ey are deprived of counterfactuals, of opportunities to make
decisions about their lives on the large scale, in much the same way that New
Jersey is deprived compared to Manhattan, about admittedly more trivial matters,
to return to Fodor’s observation about the real estate market.
So the two sides of Russell’s famous metaphor come together. e reason we
need to be at most armchair anarchists about causation and counterfactuals, turns,
in part, on the role these notions play in human life, and particularly our concep-
tion of a rich human life, a life with choices, a life with counterfactuals. It would
be unthinkable, probably impossible, to live life without them, even if they are
not fundamental, and have no role in fundamental physics, suitably construed.
And the great ìaw of modern hereditary monarchies lies in the way in which they
deprive a few individuals of some of these freedoms. is ìaw has precisely the
character suggested by Russell’s comparison: a signiëcant harm, in plain sight, to
which we are blinded by familiarity and bad metaphysics.
With some renovation, then – new foundations provided by Ramsey on the side
of causation, and a sympathetic addition of the wing that Russell himself did not
construct, on the side of the monarchy – Russell’s ediëce thus turns out to be in
remarkably good shape, on the eve of its one hundredth birthday. Please join me
in wishing it well.
ǫǲ
